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Abstract
We investigate the impact of incremental trade liberalization in a dynamic model of
endogenous growth with heterogeneous ﬁrms and costly trade. Growth originates from
horizontal specialization and the steady state productivity growth rate is positive. Inno-
vations require costly R&D and are conducted by proﬁt-seeking researchers. Including
physical capital as a factor of production, we ﬁnd that after appropriate adjustments in
the production structure, previous results on the reallocation of resources and the selec-
tion of ﬁrms following trade liberalization continue to hold. We show, however, that unlike
in the Melitz (2003) model, the reallocation eﬀect does not work through increases in the
factor price in production.
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11 Introduction
The relation between trade and growth remains unﬁnished business. On the one hand, re-
cent empirical research convincingly argues that commonly used measures of “trade openness”
are either poor measures of barriers to trade or otherwise are highly correlated with impor-
tant determinants of growth (cf. Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). Theoretical investigations, on
the other hand, highlight various speciﬁc mechanisms by which trade liberalization may af-
fect growth and/or productivity, but this literature suﬀers from clear-cut results and hardly
produces testable predictions. For example, trade liberalization lowers the real gross domes-
tic product in a typical Heckscher-Ohlin model, but increases the real gross domestic product
in models of monopolistic competition. Unfortunately, the key variables in competing models
often correspond to diﬀerent empirical measures of real income or are not observable in the
data, thus making it hard to substantiate the ﬁndings. Moreover, most recent theoretical pa-
pers abstract from consumer durables and capital goods, which account for 32% and 30% of
non-energy imports and 16% and 45% of non-energy exports in the U.S., respectively (Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust, 2007).
In this paper paper, we lay out a speciﬁc environment to study how trade aﬀects endogenous
R&D in a dynamic model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and costly trade. In particular, we set
up a model in which growth originates from horizontal specialization and the steady state
productivity growth rate is positive. Innovations require costly R&D and are conducted by
proﬁt-seeking researchers. These features are the main diﬀerence to the canonical Melitz (2003)
model.
Our model accounts for typical characteristics of both growth and trade. First, growth is
semi-endogenous and thus does not display a strong scale eﬀect. That is, the steady state
productivity growth rate is exogenous, but policy makers may well exert level eﬀects and
inﬂuence the growth rate along a transition path to the steady state. Second, we account
for various ﬁrm-level facts uncovered by the empirical trade literature. Most importantly, the
distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities is highly skewed and only the most productive ﬁrms export
in equilibrium (cf. Aw, Chung, and Roberts, 2000, Bernard and Jensen, 1999, Clerides, Lach,
and Tybout, 1998, Pavcnik, 2002, and Tybout, 2003, for a survey). Trade liberalization implies
2a reallocation of resources towards the more productive ﬁrms (cf. Melitz, 2003). Further, there
is no feedback eﬀect from exporting to a ﬁrm’s productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and
Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). The environment laid out below, is suited to allow for
both trade in ﬁnal goods and trade in durables. In this paper, however, we focus on trade in
intermediate goods which are produced from durable physical capital. The production of output
uses specialized capital inputs and labor. Traded goods are used to produce both consumption
and investment goods. Intermediate ﬁrms face endogenous ﬁxed costs for R&D and discover
production technologies with heterogenous productivities. When successful, ﬁrms enter the local
product market at a cost and decide wether or not to export their goods to a foreign market.
Technical barriers to trade imply that only the the most productive ﬁrms export. International
trade is hampered by both variable trade costs and ﬁxed market entry costs. Accounting for
the diﬀerent natures of both types of barriers to trade, we model transportation costs as capital
costs and ﬁxed trade costs as labor costs.
The reduced form of the autarky economy resembles the Jones (1995) model. Crucially,
however, the productivity in R&D is not exogenous in the absence of knowledge spillovers.
In this model with ﬁrm heterogeneity and market entry costs, the productivity in R&D is
endogenously determined by the amount of labor necessary for market entry and the average
R&D cost in the face of a minimum productivity requirement for ﬁrms.
In the open economy, we show that including trade in intermediate goods as well as produc-
tion using physical capital does not alter previous ﬁndings on the reallocation of resources and
the selection of ﬁrms. Similarly, modeling labor intensive technical barriers and capital inten-
sive marginal trading costs is not essential in the baseline speciﬁcation. In search of the speciﬁc
mechanisms implied by the monopolistic competition heterogeneous ﬁrms models, including
physical capital is an informative exercise. In Melitz (2003), trade oﬀers additional proﬁt op-
portunities only for the most productive ﬁrms. With a constant returns to scale technology,
the implied market expansion eﬀect increases the scarcity of labor, which is the only factor in
production. The increase in the wage rate drives the least productive ﬁrms out of the market.
In our model, the factor price for intermediate goods producing ﬁrms is independent of the
exposure to trade. Furthermore, including a factor that can be accumulated potentially allows
3for a more pronounced impact of trade openness. The model builds on two strands of the liter-
ature, namely research on costly trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms and non-scale variety growth.
We essentially include ﬁrms with heterogeneous marginal productivities and costly trade in
Jones’ (1995) non-scale variety growth model to account for the ﬁrm selection eﬀect of trade
openness (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003, Melitz 2003). Compared to the seminal
contribution of Melitz (2003), we model endogenous entry cost and positive long-run produc-
tivity growth. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007, henceforth BRN) study these two extensions
in a fully endogenous growth framework (with scale eﬀects) and with labor as the only factor
in production. They ﬁnd that depending on the speciﬁcation of the engine of growth, trade
is likely to depress the rate of growth because with endogenous R&D, the average R&D costs
are likely to increase with the necessary productivity for ﬁrms to produce proﬁtably. Using a
non-scale R&D technology, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007, henceforth GS) challenge this
view because of the strong knowledge spillovers implicitly assumed in the BRN analysis. Using
a semi-endogenous growth model, they argue that trade only has level eﬀects. In contrast to
the BRN model, more trade makes consumers better oﬀ as long as the knowledge spillovers in
R&D are not too strong. Both BRN and GS focus on the eﬀect of trade liberalization on pro-
ductivity and ﬁrm selection, and thus use one factor models and perishable output. A common
shortcoming is the lack of a thorough welfare analysis which is due to the complexity of the
models’ dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst present the closed economy
model. After discussing its production structure, we characterize the autarky equilibrium. Sec-
tion 3 introduces international trade. Some qualitative eﬀects of trade liberalization are dis-
cussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the world consists of two identical economies. In-
ternational trade occurs only in the form of exchanges of intermediate goods. The production
structure in each economy is adapted from Jones (1995), where we include heterogeneous ﬁrms
and market entry costs in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992a,b) and Melitz (2003).
42.1 Overview
Production structure. We explicitly distinguish between three sectors in each economy. The
R&D sector invents blueprints for intermediate goods and conducts their market launch. Two
manufacturing sectors produce intermediate goods and aggregate output, respectively.1 Output
includes consumption and investment goods.2 There are three factors in production: labor, raw
capital, and knowledge. Raw capital is the investment good, measured in terms of forgone
output. The R&D technology requires labor as the only private input, and the existing stock of
knowledge can have an external eﬀect on its productivity. Aggregate output is produced from
labor and a variety of imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods with additive-separable
eﬀects on output. The production of every intermediate good takes a blueprint and raw capital
and is conducted by a single intermediate ﬁrm.3 Each blueprint implies a speciﬁc level of
productivity that remains constant over time.
Market entry costs. When entering the market, intermediate ﬁrms must bear a uniform
entry or “beachhead” cost. Market entry is conducted using labor only, hence the entry costs
take the form of a wage payment. Newly born ﬁrms make a forward looking entry decision
based on their productivity. Firms which are suﬃciently productive earn suﬃciently high proﬁts
to cover the ﬁxed entry cost. They therefore actually launch production in the ﬁrst place and
become proﬁtable producers. Less productive ﬁrms, however, perceive that the sunk costs exceed
their discounted future proﬁts and exit right upon recognizing their productivity.
Costly trade. Each variety faces a positive demand in every country, but international
trade is costly. It involves marginal trading costs as well as ﬁxed export costs. The ﬁxed export
costs capture the additional costs a foreign company faces when selling to the local market.
Importantly, country speciﬁc regulations, standards, and similar “technical” obstacles make
1In what follows, we use the terms “output” and “ﬁnal good” interchangeably.
2We ignore government purchases and there will be no international trade in the ﬁnal good in the open
economy.
3We simply take ﬁrms to produce exactly one variety and equate ﬁrms with their products (i.e. good j is
produced by ﬁrm j and vice versa). The boundary of intermediate ﬁrms is only essential in that we require each
ﬁrm to have measure zero, so that each ﬁrm takes the price index of intermediate goods as given.
5it more costly for foreign ﬁrms to enter the home market then it is for local ﬁrms.4 The key
implication of the existence of technical barriers to trade (TBTs for short) is that only the most
productive ﬁrms self-select into the foreign market and earn additional proﬁts from exporting.
Endogenous growth. Upon investing the entry costs, intermediate ﬁrms operate under
monopolistic competition and earn positive proﬁts. The prospect of these rents stimulates
researchers to invent specialized inputs for the production of output. Introducing new in-
termediate goods continuously increases the total factor productivity (TFP) and causes growth.
Before we describe the model in greater detail, we brieﬂy contrast the present environment
with the Jones (1995) model with homogenous ﬁrms, discuss its production structure in the open
economy with variable trade costs, and explain how ﬁrms with heterogeneous productivities
arise from newly discovered blueprints.
2.2 Heterogeneous ﬁrms, trade, and the Jones (1995) model
Homogeneous ﬁrms, durable intermediates. The production structure of the Jones (1995)
model is taken from Romer (1990). In Romer (1990), the capital stock comprises a continuum
of durable capital goods, which imperfectly substitute in the production of output, with ad-
ditively separable eﬀects.5 The capital goods are assembled by intermediate ﬁrms. Using k(j)
units of the investment good, ﬁrm j assembles x(j) = k(j) units of the specialized capital good
j. The investment good, “raw capital”, is produced from labor and existing durable goods. It is
convenient and common practice to assume identical production technologies for the consump-
tion good and the investment good so that the output from both sectors can be summarized as
aggregate output which can either be used for investment or for consumption. Romer (1990)
already noted that the one-to-one production of intermediate goods from raw capital is merely
assumed to keep the model simple. Similarly, uniform production technologies across interme-
4See Baldwin (2000) for an illustrative introduction to technical barriers to trade.
5Breaking up the capital stock in a continuum of imperfectly substitutable goods allows for positive market
rents, which are necessary to cover the innovation costs when production technologies are not strictly convex
(see, among others, Romer, 1990).
6diate ﬁrms are typically used only for analytical convenience.
Heterogenous ﬁrms. In this research, intermediate ﬁrms are heterogeneous with respect
to their productivity. We thereby incrementally extend two workhorse models. First, relative to
the Jones (1995) model, the average “eﬃciency” of intermediate ﬁrms contributes as a second,
“vertical” dimension of productivity to the level of TFP.6 The range, and along with it the
average of ﬁrms’ productivities in production, is endogenously determined by the degree of
trade openness as measured by trade costs. In contrast to growth models with both horizontal
and vertical innovations, only the number of varieties increases continuously over time (R&D
with heterogeneous ﬁrms is addressed in detail in the next but one paragraph). Second, relative
to the existing literature on growth and trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms, intermediate goods are
not only used for consumption, but also for investment. This extension opens up the possibility
of a more pronounced impact of trade. Accounting for the accumulation of physical capital, we
further add a second factor in production.
Marginal trade costs and the allocation of capital. The presence of marginal trade
costs requires a careful modeling of the spatial allocation of physical capital. The production
structure of the Jones (1995) model in principle allows two equitable interpretations. The ﬁrst,
classical interpretation (used by Romer, 1990 and Jones, 1995) is that intermediate goods are
durable inputs in the production of output. Intermediate good producing ﬁrms assemble the
durables from raw capital and pass the processed capital on to output producing ﬁrms. In this
case, capital accumulates at the location of the ﬁnal good production. In the second interpre-
tation, raw capital is a durable good in the production of intermediate goods. Intermediate
ﬁrms accumulate physical capital to produce perishable inputs for the production of aggre-
gate output. In this case, the capital stock is located at the origin of the intermediate good
production.
No trade in durable commodities. In the closed economy, both interpretations are
equivalent. As long as there are no variable transportation cost, both interpretations are equiv-
6Li (2000), Young (1998), and Kornprobst (2008, Ch. 9) present models with two R&D sectors and both
horizontal and vertical innovations. Sorger (2007) considers quality improving horizontal innovations in a one-
sector R&D model, where researchers can inﬂuence the quality of their innovations at the cost of a reduced
quantity of innovations.
7alent in the open economy as well. To simplify matters, in what follows, we focus on per-
ishable inputs in the production of durable investment and consumption goods (we stick to
the second interpretation above). Since we also rule out trade in aggregate output, there is
no accumulation of physical capital by imports.7 From an empirical point of view, neglecting
trade in durable/capital goods appears as a severe shortcut. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2007)
ﬁnd for the U.S. that consumer durables and capital goods amount to 32% and 30% of non-
energy imports, and 16% and 45% of non-energy exports, respectively. In their data, consumer
non-durables represent about one-fourth of non-energy imports and exports. The remainder is
non-energy industrial supplies used in the production of durables.
Variety expanding R&D and heterogeneous ﬁrms. The discovery of blueprints for
new intermediate goods is at the heart of our model of growth and trade. A crucial question
is how labor and knowledge are transformed into blueprints with heterogeneous productivities.
We adapt the modeling in BRN, but use a non-scale technology like GS. Following Melitz
(2003), the productivity types of blueprints are drawn from a given stationary distribution.
The resources necessary to produce a suﬃciently valuable blueprint however are endogenously
determined.
Stochastic productivity draws. While researchers can be certain about ﬁnding a new
blueprint, its inherent productivity is random. Every research attempt is a costly draw. Due to
the entry costs, only blueprints with a suﬃciently high productivity (and hence a suﬃciently
high market value) sell at a positive price. For the sake of clarity, we formally treat R&D
and manufacturing as performed in separate sectors. As regards content, we may equivalently
combine the two activities for a given variety in “the ﬁrm”. With a slight abuse of terms, we
then also call costly developed blueprints which do not make it into the product market “ﬁrms”.
This gives us a theoretical counterpart to those very low productivity type ﬁrms for which the
empirical trade literature has identiﬁed a high death rate. In the model, these “ﬁrms” exit
immediately upon recognizing their productivity.
Costly aggregate productivity gains. One of the contributions of BRN is to incorporate
the idea that increasing the productivity of innovations is costly, in the sense that R&D (c.p.
7The “trade in intermediate goods only” approach follows Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
8and on average) requires more resources if its outcome is to be more productive. In modeling
this notion, BRN look at R&D from an aggregate point of view and consider the average
costs associated with the discovery of a marketable blueprint. A potential drawback of this
“aggregate R&D” approach is the lack of intentional investments in more productive capital
goods. In fact, individual researchers cannot inﬂuence the productivities of their innovations.
From the individual researcher’s perspective, conditional on being usable, high productivity
type blueprints are “lucky draws” and as such, they come for free: every draw is equally costly.
As will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.5, free entry into R&D does not remove the
windfall gains associated with high productivities because researchers must break even across
usable and unusable innovations in expectations.
A productivity frontier in R&D. As a ﬁnal remark, note that there is a close analogy
between the “aggregate R&D” approach and a productivity-quantity frontier in R&D. That
is, an increase in the quality of products will c.p. come at the cost of fewer innovations.8
Increasing the minimum productivity requirement (again c.p.) forces researchers to move along
the technologically given productivity-quantity frontier towards more productive blueprints
and fewer innovations. Trade liberalization, as measured by a decrease in the foreign market
entry costs, actually raises the minimum productivity requirement, thereby increasing the
average productivity of intermediate ﬁrms. This productivity gain however is not “manna
from heaven” but takes costly resources and implies that the set of intermediate goods at least
temporarily expands at a lower rate. Via this channel, the exposure to trade has the potential
to slow down productivity gains from specialization. Hence, trade liberalization may at least
temporarily depress growth and at the same time have ambiguous eﬀects on TFP.
To begin with, we show how endogenous horizontal innovation and TFP is aﬀected by
a minimum productivity requirement in autarky. We then turn to the open economy with
international trade in section 3.1.
8Sorger (2007) explicitly includes such a frontier in R&D in a closed economy, free entry model of variety
growth. In his model, researchers choose the quality of their innovations optimally, recognizing that higher
qualities imply fewer R&D output (cf. footnote 6).
92.3 Autarky
The economy is characterized by preferences, endowments, technologies, and a speciﬁc institu-
tional environment. As in Romer (1990), Jones (1995), or Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the
speciﬁc environment laid out below allows a concise exposition and is only one example of an
environment that supports the decentralization. The model is set in continuous time and ﬁnal
output is used as the num´ eraire. We omit the time argument, t, wherever it is not confusing,
and occasionally abbreviate variables in the argument of functions by a centered dot (“ · ”).
2.3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of identical households. Every household
consists of L homogenous members, who inelastically supply one unit of labor each (there is
no disutility from work). The population grows at an exogenously given, constant rate ˙ L/L ≡
n ≥ 0, and L(0) > 0.9 The households are inﬁnitely-lived Barrovian (1974) dynasties, where
each generation cares about the well-being of all its future oﬀsprings. Every household member
consumes an equal amount c of aggregate output Y . The consumption behavior is therefore
appropriately summarized by the optimal decision of one household. Preferences are given by
a standard intertemporal utility function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution









ρ (> 0) is the subjective discount rate.
Every household earns income from working and returns on assets and purchases consump-
tion goods and assets. The ﬂow budget constraint is ˙ ζ = wL + rζ − cL, where wL and cL
denote the household’s labor income and consumption, respectively, and rζ is the return on
asset holdings ζ at interest rate r. Assets comprise ownership claims on physical and ﬁnancial
9Arnold (1998) replaces population growth with human capital accumulation in a Grossman-Helpman (1991,
Ch. 3) framework (without physical capital) and thereby shows explicitly that L can be interpreted more broadly
as the eﬀective labor force.
10The elasticity of marginal utility is also constant and equals −σ.
10capital (loans and debts between households cancel in the representative households’ budget
constraint). Subsequent assumptions on the observability of ﬁrm types and the capital market
ensure that physical capital and all types of equity are perfect substitutes as vehicles of savings.
They all pay a common rate of return r.
Ponzi-games, where some households borrow inﬁnitely to “repay” consumption loans (and
in fact never actually repay their credit), are ruled out by a borrowing constraint imposed in
the capital market. Bankers will not lend out more than the present value of a household’s
income. Hence the present value of consumption expenditures is bounded above by the present
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2.3.2 Technology in manufacturing
Output. Aggregate output Y is produced using a set of measure A of vertically diﬀerentiated







αdj, 0 < α < 1. (1)
Output is manufactured by a large number of identical ﬁrms (the number of ﬁrms is indeter-
minate because of constant returns to scale for a given level of A).12 Labor and intermediate
goods are complements (∂2Y/(∂x∂LY) > 0). The elasticity of substitution between any pair of
intermediates is (1 <)  ≡ 1/(1−α) (< ∞). Given the parameter restriction implicit in (1), the
intermediate goods have an additively separable eﬀect on output (∂2Y/[∂x(j)∂x(j0)] = 0).13 As
usual, the parameter α jointly determines the returns to horizontal specialization in the pro-
duction of output, the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (which indicates
11Non-negativity constraints on consumption can be ignored as the instantaneous utility function u(c) satisﬁes
u0(c) → ∞ as c → 0.
12The production function in (1) of course displays increasing returns in LY , all x(j), and A jointly.
13Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) introduce a more general production function Y = AγXβL
1−β









where intermediates can be substitutes (α > β) or complements (α < β). We implicitly
impose γ = 1 − β and α = β for simplicity.
11the degree of market power of intermediate producers), the price elasticity of demand, and also
pins down constant shares of factor incomes in equilibrium.14
Intermediates. Every intermediate good is produced from raw capital by an intermediate
ﬁrm that exclusively owns its blueprint. Each blueprint implies a constant level of productivity
in production which carries over to its producer. The ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in productivities are




, b(j) ∈ (0,b0]. (2)
More productive ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with low b(j), require less raw capital k(j) to produce one unit
of their intermediate good. Unlike in the original Romer model (1990), we treat raw capital as
a durable good in the production of perishable intermediate goods. The production and export
of the intermediates implies a permanent ﬂow of production and transport costs and simpliﬁes
the open economy model in Section 3.
2.3.3 Technology in R&D
The presence of entry costs implies that forward looking, proﬁt-driven ﬁrms only launch
production with blueprints that yield a positive operating proﬁt. Firms’ proﬁts are obviously
increasing in productivity, which implies that the lowest productivity-type blueprints will be
discarded due to the entry costs. If this minimum productivity requirement is binding, the
number of intermediate goods (A) is lower than the total number of discovered blueprints
(B). In Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), there are no barriers to entry and every discovered
blueprint is used to produce a new variety (A = B). To tackle this issue, we may think of
the R&D technology conceptually as involving two parts. “Research” comprises the process
of discovering a previously unknown blueprint. “Development” involves the productivity in
production inherent in each blueprint. We consider both parts in turn.
14It is possible to disentangle the elasticity of output with respect to (horizontal) specialization and the
substitutability of capital goods, see Benassy (1998). Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) also disentangle the
degree of substitutability from the capital share, see footnote 13.
12Discovery of blueprints. Researchers deterministically invent new blueprints ˙ B using




, χ > 0, FB > 0. (3)
LB is the number of people searching for new blueprints, and FB inversely measures their
productivity. Following common practice in endogenous growth theory, innovation displays
constant returns to scale in its only private input, labor. Previous research eﬀorts can have
external eﬀects on the magnitude of labor required for innovation, and we follow BRN in
choosing the existing number of intermediate goods (A) to represent the relevant knowledge
stock.15 The exponent 1−χ accounts for the strength and the sign of the knowledge spillovers.
Researchers may either “stand on the shoulders of giants” and beneﬁt from past innovations






so that the growth rate of B declines if B increases for a given LB. It then takes positive growth
of the labor input to maintain positive long-run growth. At t = 0, the economy is endowed with
a mass B(0) = B0 of blueprints with distribution G(b).
Jones’ (1995) R&D technology is intended to eliminate the strong scale eﬀect, i.e. the depen-
dence of the productivity growth rate on the level of labor engaged in R&D in the long run. In
doing so, his speciﬁcation “exogenizes” long-run growth. Suppose A = B and ˙ LB/LB (as is the
case along a balanced growth path in Jones’ model). Then, a constant growth rate of the num-
ber of blueprints requires n − χ ˙ B/B = 0, or ˙ B/B = n/χ.16 Thus, growth is semi-endogenous
(in that the long run growth rate cannot be inﬂuenced by policy) and trade liberalization can
“only” exert level eﬀects.
Having described the discovery process, we now turn to the productivity in production
15Without intentional investments in qualities, B seems equally appropriate as A to represent past innovation
eﬀorts.
16In the aforementioned Sorger (2007) model with intentional investment in quality, growth does not display
a strong scale eﬀect. In his model, policy makers can aﬀect the growth rate if they are able to design quality
contingent subsidies (see also Howitt, 1998).
13Figure 1: The Pareto distribution of input coeﬃcients.
that comes along with each blueprint.
Stochastic assignment of productivities. The level of productivity is indicated by
variety-speciﬁc input coeﬃcients, which are randomly assigned to each blueprint and revealed
after the R&D investment is made (i.e., at the time a blueprint is discovered). The input coeﬃ-
cients are drawn from a distribution which has many low productivity types, fewer intermediate
productivity types, and only a few types of very high productivity. To be speciﬁc, the input
coeﬃcients are drawn from the “mirrored” Pareto distribution
G(b) = (b/b0)
θ, b ∈ [0,b0], (4)
where the parameters b0 (> 0) and
θ > max{ − 1,1}
govern the width of the support and the shape of the cumulative distribution function, respec-
tively. Figure 2.3.3 depicts the distribution of input coeﬃcients for θ = 2 (blue), θ = 4 (red),
and θ = 8 (green) with b0 = 1. Imposing a lower bound on θ serves two purposes. First, as will
become clear below, θ >  − 1 ensures that the input coeﬃcient of the least productive ﬁrm is
strictly positive (so that there is a non-degenerated distribution of ﬁrms). Second, it preserves
the intended skewness towards low productivity types in case of α < 0.5 (in this case, θ > −1
does not imply θ > 1).17 θ measures the steepness or “dispersion” of the distribution and can
17Both BRN and GS do not impose the second parameter restriction which, however, is only important for
the interpretation.
14therefore be interpreted as the inherent likelihood (or “diﬃculty”) of inventing high productiv-
ity types. Increasing θ gives ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated distributions, i.e. distributions
that are more skewed towards high input coeﬃcients (θ = 0 is the uniform distribution and
θ → ∞ yields a degenerate distribution at b0, in which case G(b) → 0 for all b < b0).18
From blueprints to ﬁrms. The distribution underlying the productivity types of newly
discovered blueprints directly translates into the productivity distribution of ﬁrms. This is
because the Pareto distribution has the property of scale invariance: truncating a Pareto dis-
tribution yields another Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter.19 As an example,
suppose that the cumulative distribution function G(b) is truncated at some minimum produc-
tivity 1/btrunc. The resulting distribution of input coeﬃcients is
















for b ∈ [0,btrunc]. Thus, when some blueprints are not used due to the minimum productivity
requirement, the distribution of ﬁrms productivities still remains Pareto, and θ equivalently
reﬂects the dispersion in the truncated distribution (the support simply shrinks from [0,b0]
to [0,btrunc]). Given the shape of the underlying productivity distribution, the distribution of
ﬁrms’ productivities matches the empirical regularity that the proportion of less productive
ﬁrms is large.
Justifying the Pareto distribution. Like BRN and GS, we specify a functional form
to obtain a closed form solution. The Pareto distribution is attractive for two reasons. Firstly,
it receives strong empirical support when it comes to matching the observable distribution of
productivities, see e.g. Cabral and Mata (2003) and Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano
(2007). Secondly, as pointed out above, it allows a tractable analytical exposition of the distri-
bution of ﬁrm types because truncating a Pareto distribution yields another Pareto distribution
with the same shape parameter (it is scale invariant).


















1+θb0 and Var(b) =









0 (which is decreasing in θ).
19More generally, the Pareto distribution belongs to the class of power law distributions, which are charac-
terized by the scale invariance property (θ is then consistently called the scaling parameter).
152.3.4 Markets
The markets for labor, the ﬁnal good, and ﬁnancial capital are all perfectly competitive. Pro-
ducers of capital goods hold inﬁnitely-lived, fully enforced patents. All markets clear. Ownership
claims on physical capital and ﬁnancial wealth are perfect substitutes and pay the same rate
of return, r.
Fundamental evaluation. Once a ﬁrm’s input coeﬃcient is revealed (upon discovery of its
blueprint), it immediately becomes common knowledge. We denote by π(j) the instantaneous






where ¯ r ≡
R s
t r(ς)dς is the cumulative interest rate up to time s ≥ t. In the absence of bubbles,
and due to the sunk nature of both innovation and entry costs, v(j) is the market value of ﬁrm
j (with input coeﬃcient b(j)). Diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to time t reveals that, given the
deﬁnition of v(j) as fundamental value, the returns from investing in any productivity-type of
ﬁrm, i.e. the dividend payments plus capital gains, have to equal the common return on either
asset:
π(j) + ˙ v(j) = rv(j) ∀j ∈ [0,A]. (6)
Market clearing. Labor market clearing requires that the sum of labor in innovation, market
entry, and production is equal to the labor force,
L = LB + LE + LY. (7)
We further denote by LA ≡ LB + LE the total labor force engaged in the process of R&D and
market entry, which we henceforth refer to as R&E (a mnemonic for R&D plus entry).





Capital does not depreciate. In Jones (1995), where b(j) = b = 1, the sum of intermediate
goods equals the amount of accumulated forgone consumption, i.e., the stock of raw capital.
Here, with heterogeneously productive ﬁrms, the sum of intermediate outputs is proportional
to the stock of raw capital and the factor of proportionality equals the output weighted average





If intermediate ﬁrms become more productive on average, an increased amount of intermediate
goods can be obtained from forgoing a given amount of consumption.21
Finally, the resource constraint deﬁned over economy-wide aggregates is
Y = cL + ˙ K. (10)
2.3.5 Market Entry
Launching the production of a newly discovered capital good is equally costly to all entrants.
To keep the analytical exposition simple, we follow BRN and assume identical production
functions (and thereby “factor intensities”) in R&D and the conduct of entry. The productivity
in the entry process thereby indicates the markets’ “openness”. Strictly speaking, the entrant
is required to hire Aχ−1FL workers and pay the associated wage bill wAχ−1FL. FL measures the
strength of the barriers to entry.22 To ensure that the input coeﬃcient of the least productive
ﬁrm in equilibrium is strictly smaller than the upper bound of the underlying distribution, b0
(i.e. that the minimum productivity requirement introduced by the entry cost is binding in
equilibrium), we impose a lower bound on FL:
FB < (φ − 1)b
θ
0FL. (PA1)
At any point in time, the economy-wide amount of labor devoted to preparing entry is
LE = ˙ AA
χ−1FL. (11)
20Given mark-up pricing in the intermediate good sector, the output weighted average productivity is closely
related to the CES price index. In his one-factor zero-growth model, Melitz (2003, footnote 9) uses such a
output-weighted average to measure overall productivity.
21As pointed out in the model introduction, assuming that capital can be accumulated as forgone output
implies that raw capital is produced with the same technology as the ﬁnal good. “Forgone consumption” in the
above interpretation is thus not actually produced in the ﬁrst place, but the respective resources are used to
produce, i.e. accumulate, raw capital instead.
22In BRN and GS, the interpretation of the innovation and entry process is that researchers have to accumulate
FB units of knowledge for inventing a new blueprint and FL units of knowledge to cope with market entry.
17Since all productivities are immediately revealed and become common knowledge when the
blueprint is discovered, the entry decision involves no uncertainty.23
Justifying the entry speciﬁcation. Four remarks on the speciﬁcation of entry costs are
in order. First, the scaling of entry costs by Aχ−1 makes a balanced growth equilibrium with a
constant ratio of entry costs and the market value of a new capital good (which, by construction,
lies between zero and one) possible. Without resorting to (completely) arbitrary scaling factors,
we could alternatively use FLK/A or FLY/A (and include the use of resources in the respective
market clearing/resource condition). Second, identical production functions in R&D and entry
turn out to be particularly convenient because they allow a manageable analytical treatment
of the free entry into R&D condition. Third, exploiting the block-recursive structure of the
Jones (1995) model, identical “factor intensities” in R&D and entry allow simple aggregations
of both processes. Fourth, in the open economy, trade is restricted by marginal costs and TBTs.
Modeling variable trade costs as iceberg costs implies that they are capital costs. With respect
to the nature of TBTs, we assume that overcoming technical obstacles is by far more labor
intensive, and take the extreme standpoint that ﬁxed barriers to trade imply only labor costs.
Equilibrium
Having described the environment, we now derive optimality conditions, deﬁne the equilib-
rium, and aggregate over the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. The subsequent section then characterizes
the equilibrium balanced growth path.
2.4 Optimality conditions
Households and ﬁrms maximize their utility and proﬁts, respectively. We consider their decisions
in turn.
23This timing structure emphasizes the importance of entry cost. If researchers individually knew the pro-
ductivity of their future innovations, the sunk innovation cost would obviously be suﬃcient to prevent low
productivity types from being invented in the ﬁrst place.
182.4.1 Households
Optimal behavior of households boils down to choosing a path for consumption. Given a measure
B ≥ B0 of ﬁrms, households are able to pool the risk of investing ﬁrms whose type is a priori
unknown. Hence, optimal consumption is not aﬀected by the actually prevailing productivity
distribution of ﬁrms in a household’s portfolio or in the economy. Maximizing intertemporal
utility subject to the ﬂow budget constraint and the no-Ponzi game condition (or, equivalently,
to an intertemporal budget constraint that limits the present value of consumption spending




r − ρ − n
σ
(12)
and a transversality condition.24 As usual, the Euler equation gives the rate of consumption
growth that optimally relates the subjective discount rate (including household growth) and
the market interest rate.
24If households maximize utility in per capita terms, the present value Hamiltonian is
H = e−ρtu(c) + λ(wL + rζ − cL),
where λ represents the shadow price of wealth. H is concave in c and ζ, so that the following ﬁrst-order conditions
are suﬃcient for optimality:
∂H
∂c
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in the second optimality condition yields (12). Substituting λ = e−ρtc−σ/L and u0 (c) = c−σ in the third
optimality condition, the transversality condition requires that households must not get any utility out assets










Proﬁt maximization and competition in the output producing sector imply that the aggregate















Given the demand function in (14), every intermediate goods producer producing ﬁrm max-
imizes its proﬁt π(j) by charging a price equal to a constant mark-up over the ﬁrm-speciﬁc




, ∀j ∈ [0,A]. (15)
Using (15) in (14), the equilibrium demand and revenues R(j) ≡ p(j)x(j) of ﬁrm j with






1− LY, ∀j ∈ [0,A]. (17)
From (15), proﬁts amount to
π(j) = (1 − α)R(j), ∀j ∈ [0,A]. (18)
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which implies that proﬁts are convex (concave) in productivity if  > 2 ( < 2), i.e. α > (<)1/2.
Gains from increasing degrees of specialization with imperfectly substitutable intermediate
goods limits a complete allocation of resources towards the most productive ﬁrms. In particular,
20the market entry costs are the necessary ingredient to prevent the least productive ﬁrms from
operating: There is always a positive demand for any variety as long as any output is produced
(LY > 0), and mark-up pricing guarantees positive operating proﬁts for ﬁrms of all productivity
types. In the absence of barriers to entry (FL = 0), all ﬁrms launch production, b∗
L = b0, so
that A = B.
No durable goods monopoly problem. Note that our interpretation of the production
structure with durable goods in the intermediate rather than the ﬁnal good sector naturally
avoids the usual “durable goods monopoly problem”. When monopolists actually sell durable
goods, tomorrow’s demand is a close substitute to today’s demand, and ﬁrms with market power
account for the fact that today’s sales come at the expense of tomorrow’s sales. Tirole (1988,
section 1.5) shows that monopolists then have an incentive to increase today’s quantities at the
expense of tomorrow’s demand and do so in the absence of commitment to output quantities.
Romer (1990) points out that in his model environment, selling durable goods to the ﬁnal good
sector potentially results in a more complicated pricing problem than the “static” program
stated above. To avoid this complication, Romer (1990, in a closed economy) and Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991, in an open economy) formally assume that the durable goods are rented.
In our interpretation, the problem is resolved since there is no monopolistic supplier of the
investment good.
From goods to productivities. In this environment, the intermediate ﬁrms’ prices, quan-
tities, proﬁts, and ﬁrm values diﬀer only due to heterogeneous productivities. As of this point,
it is thus reasonable to drop the ﬁrm index j and phrase the equilibrium expressions in terms




, x(b,·) = α
2(rb)
−LY, (19)
and from (18) and the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm value in (5),







Similarly, the time derivatives of the ﬁrm values in (6) simplify to
rv(b,·) = π(b,·) + ˙ v(b,·). (21)
21Understanding ﬁrm heterogeneity. To improve our understanding of ﬁrm heterogeneity
in this production environment, consider a ﬁrm with input coeﬃcient b that is more eﬃcient




























The relative output and input quantities are thus independent of endogenous variables, and the




















The second equality holds because of our assumptions on the fundamental capital market
evaluation above. Since the input coeﬃcients are constant over time, the proﬁts of ﬁrms of all










and b cancels from the last term (because it can be pulled out of the integral). Hence, ˆ v (b,·) =
ˆ v (j) = ˆ v so that the dividend ratio is identical across ﬁrms of all productivity types. In
equilibrium, ﬁrms with a higher productivity sell higher quantities, demand more raw capital
(as the lower input coeﬃcient is oﬀset by the rise in total demand), receive higher proﬁts, and
have a higher market value. An increase in α ampliﬁes the diﬀerences. Figure 2 depicts a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and its market value as a function of its productivity for  < 2.25 We summarize these
ﬁndings in
Result 1 (Productivity and ﬁrm size). In equilibrium, more eﬃcient ﬁrms are larger: they
produce more output and use more raw capital than less eﬃcient ﬁrms. Proﬁts and ﬁrm values
are increase and concave (convex) in the ﬁrm’s productivity if  < (>)2.
25Diﬀerentiating equilibrium proﬁts with respect to b yields
∂π(b,·)
∂b = ( − 1)
π(b,·)
b2 > 0. This immediately
gives a ﬁrm value function that is of the same shape, since the dividend ratio is the same for all productivity
type ﬁrms which implies that the ratio of the slopes of v and π is identical across productivity types.
22Figure 2: Firm’s proﬁts and value as a function of productivity ( < 2).
Obviously, higher input prices (r ↑), and less demand from the ﬁnal good sector (LY ↓)
c.p. imply smaller proﬁts. Clearly also, the proﬁts of more eﬃcient ﬁrms react stronger to such









Proﬁts and α. The relation between ﬁrms’ proﬁts and the parameter α deserves a
short comment. As pointed out above, changing α has multiple implications, and it also
captures opposing eﬀects on intermediate ﬁrms’ proﬁts. On the one hand, like in the canonical
trade models with love of variety preferences, a low degree of substitutability between the
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good inputs (a low α) allows the monopolists to charge a high mark-up 1/α,
and (as demand is inelastic) earn high revenues and high proﬁts. On the other hand, α also
measures the capital share in the production of ﬁnal output. Hence, a small α also presumes
less demand for capital goods from producers of output goods. Using standard parameters, the
latter eﬀect prevails and proﬁts are increasing in α.26
26In fact, the sign of the net eﬀect actually depends on the size of the input coeﬃcient. From (20),


















Let us return to the entry decision of the ﬁrm. The imposed upper bound on FB restricts the
analysis to the case where FL (or b0) is suﬃciently “large” so that the entry costs exceed the
market value of the least productive ﬁrms (i.e. v(b0,·) < wA1−χFL holds in equilibrium by
assumption). Thus, only suﬃciently productive ﬁrms are willing to bear the entry cost. Given
market prices, the cutoﬀ productivity associated with proﬁtable entry, 1/bL, is determined by
v(bL,·) ≡ wA
χ−1FL. (23)
Equation (23) is illustrated in Figure 3. Firms with a productivity below 1/bL will not incur
the entry costs and “die” instantaneously. More productive ﬁrms incur the costs and launch
production. Due to the scale invariant nature of the Pareto distribution, whereby truncating the
distribution maintains both the type of the distribution and its shape parameter, all information
about the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities is contained in the cutoﬀ productivity
(for example, bL easily translates into the output weighted average productivity). We explore
this convenient feature further in the next section.






+ 2 [2lnα − ln(rb)].





















For more productive ﬁrms (with b < ¯ b), proﬁts increase in α, since for them the positive eﬀect of a high ﬁnal
good demand outweighs the negative eﬀect due to a low mark-up. For less productive ﬁrms (those with input
coeﬃcient b > ¯ b), the increase in demand is not suﬃciently strong to outweigh the proﬁt decreasing eﬀect of a
lower mark up. Since α captures opposing eﬀects, comparative statics with respect to α are not unambiguous.
24Figure 3: The cutoﬀ productivity in autarky.
A law of motion for A. A binding cutoﬀ (bL < b0) implies that researchers can only sell
suﬃciently productive blueprints to proﬁt-seeking manufacturers. Given a continuum of newly
discovered blueprints at any point in time, we rely on a law of large numbers and conclude that
the fraction of proﬁtable blueprints is G(bL). Hence, the evolution of A is governed by
˙ A = G(bL) ˙ B if ˙ bL = 0. (24)
Since only a fraction G(bL) < 1 of newly discovered blueprint will actually go into production
(and increase the specialization in the production of aggregate output), an increase in the min-
imum productivity requirement c.p. depresses the dynamic gains from horizontal specialization.
Labor allocation in R&E. In view of (24), let us clarify the allocation of labor between
R&D and market entry. By construction, the ratio of labor in R&D to labor in entry is ﬁxed







Every newly invented intermediate good requires FL (times Aχ−1) workers to realize its mar-
ket entry and, on average, it takes FB/G(bL) (times Aχ−1) workers to discover a producible
blueprint. Labor market clearing requires that the labor shares in entry, R&D, and production
sum up to unity. Using this relation to replace LB, and solving for the share of labor in the
25Figure 4: Labor shares in R&D and entry against the labor share in production for a given
cutoﬀ.














Figure 4 shows the labor shares in R&E as a function of the labor share in the production of
output for a given cutoﬀ productivity 1/bL. The upper line depicts the labor market clearing







The lower line corresponds to the allocation of labor between entry and R&D, i.e. to equation
(26). Of course, the horizontal distance between the two lines is the share of labor in R&D,
LB/L, since the labor market clearing line has slope −1. Suppose that the share of labor in
production is not aﬀected by the productivity distribution of intermediate ﬁrms (which we shall
prove later on in Corollary 8). Then, for a given cutoﬀ, LE/L(LY/L) simply centers around
LY/L = 1 as FL changes. We will come back to property after we will have characterized the
equilibrium cutoﬀ.
Free entry into R&D. In an equilibrium with free entry into R&D, the expected operating









If the expected net return to R&D (the left-hand side), i.e. the market value of a capital good
net of the entry cost (the term in squared brackets on the left-hand side), exceeds the R&D
cost (the right-hand side), more researchers enter and discover a higher number of blueprints,
thereby driving down the value of innovations. Similarly, if the expected net returns to R&D
are not suﬃcient to cover the R&D cost, researchers leave and become production workers,
thereby reducing the number of innovations and increasing the market value of innovations.
Hence, the expected return to R&D must equal the total innovation costs; from (27),
Z bL
0
v (b,·)dG(b) = wA
χ−1 [FB + G(bL)FL]. (28)
Finally, we deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a path of quantities
c,LA,LE,LY,Y,K,A,B,{x(j),k(j)}j∈[0,A], prices r,w,{p(j),π(j),v(j)}j∈[0,A], and the cutoﬀ
productivity bL that satisﬁes technologies (1), (2), (3), (11), and (24), the entry conditions
(23) and (27), the optimality conditions (12), (13), (14), and (15), the resource constraints
(7) and (10), as well as the deﬁnitions of π, v, and K.27
2.5 Aggregation for a given cutoﬀ
We derive the equilibrium outcome in aggregate terms in two steps. First, we aggregate over all
productivity type ﬁrms for a given level of the cutoﬀ productivity. In a second step, we solve
for the cutoﬀ and characterize the equilibrium.
Suppose for the time being that the cutoﬀ productivity 1/bL is initially given and constant.
Since all entrants are required to pay the entry costs, the productivity distribution in the prod-
uct market, denoted by µ(b;bL), is the productivity distribution of blueprints, G(b), conditional
27As usual in general equilibrium theory, the households’ budget constraint is another, but dependent, equation










, b ∈ [0,bL]. (29)
Using µ(b), it is an easy task to aggregate over all active ﬁrm types.29 Intuitively speaking,
the probability density function µ0 (b) gives the mass of ﬁrms for each level of productivity,
relative to the total mass of active ﬁrms, A. The “number” of ﬁrms with the same level of
productivity hence equals Aµ0 (b) for each productivity level b. Taking into account that only
ﬁrms with productivities above the cutoﬀ productivity incur the entry cost, integrating over all
active productivity levels b ≤ bL then gives the aggregate intermediate outcome. To begin with,
consider the capital stock in (9). Instead of aggregating over the raw capital inputs k (j) =
b(j)x(j) of all ﬁrms j ∈ [0,A], we equivalently aggregate over all active productivity types
















28In a setup with a random positive death rate for active ﬁrms and a large pool of potential entrants,
Melitz (2003) shows that the long-run equilibrium distribution of active ﬁrms is ˜ G(b)/ ˜ G(bL) if the universe
of productivities is described by a more general class of probability distributions ˜ G(b). The random death of
ﬁrms of all productivity types is needed for the distribution of active productivity types to converge back to
˜ G(b)/ ˜ G(bL) after a shock to bL. In our environment, where A grows at a positive rate, the transition between two
distributions of active ﬁrms’ productivity types with diﬀerent cutoﬀs is naturally achieved as the share of those
productivities that are no longer introduced goes to zero in ﬁnite time. This is equivalent to randomized ﬁrm
death, which steadily brings the productivity distribution of active ﬁrms back to the productivity distribution
of newcomers whenever this distribution remains constant over time. To simplify the exposition, we drop the
dependency of the active ﬁrms’ productivity distribution’s support on the cutoﬀ whenever doing so does not
lead to confusion.
29When aggregating over all ﬁrm types, we choose to express the outcome of the aggregation by equilibrium
quantities of the cutoﬀ productivity type ﬁrm. Following Melitz (2003), BRN, and GS we could alternatively
apply an output-weighted average productivity type ﬁrm. Our choice, which of course is as good as any other
productivity type, is motivated by the fact that the aggregate outcome in terms of the cutoﬀ productivity makes





























where φ ≡ θ/(θ −  + 1) (> 1).30 To ease the exposition, use (16) again:
K = φAbLx(bL,·). (32)
The average productivity. The average output weighted productivity ¯ b is deﬁned by
K = ¯ b
Z A
0






























For a given amount of accumulated savings, the output of intermediate ﬁrms is obviously
larger, the more eﬃciently resources are transformed into intermediate goods, i.e. the smaller ¯ b.
Of course, with a Pareto distribution, the output-weighted average input coeﬃcient increases
with the input coeﬃcient of the least productive ﬁrm.
Comparing the output-weighted average, ¯ b = (θ−)/(θ+1−)bL, to the unweighted average















θ−(−1) > 1 since θ >  − 1 by (PA1) and  > 1.
29conﬁrms the intuition that the diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ output is more pronounced, the lower
the degree of substitutability between intermediate goods ( ↑). That is, competition in the
product market (measured by the degree of substitutability between intermediate goods) works
against the variance reducing eﬀect of ﬁxed cost.31
Aggregate proﬁts and ﬁrm values. Turning to ﬁrm’s market values, we ﬁrst derive the
aggregate intermediate producers’ proﬁts. Using (15) and (31),
Z A
0








b(j)x(j)dj = (1 − α)α
2−1φA(rbL)
1− LY.
From (17), we have Z A
0
π(j)dj = (1 − α)AφR(bL,·) = Aφπ(bL,·). (35)
The average proﬁt is thus φ times the proﬁt of ﬁrms operating with the cutoﬀ productivity,
φπ(bL) =
R A
0 π(j)dj/A. Using (6), the same is true for the cutoﬀ productivity type ﬁrm value.
From π(j) = v(j)(r − ˆ v) and (35), we ﬁnd
Z A
0
v(j)dj = Aφv(bL,·). (36)
The diﬀerence in the market value of ﬁrms with the cutoﬀ productivity and the average pro-
ductivity is larger, the larger φ. φ accounts for the characteristics of the underlying distribution
of productivities (as summarized by θ and b0) and includes α as an indicator of the value of
productivity.32 Consistent with the previous observation on relative proﬁts, the value of av-
erage productivity type ﬁrms is low relative to the value of ﬁrms operating with the cutoﬀ
productivity if α is small (φ is larger, the larger α). A large α implies a high level of all ﬁrms’
values33, and more unevenly distributed proﬁts. Put diﬀerently, the dispersion in the values
of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels depends positively on α (α → 0 implies φ → 1 and
31Note that this conclusion is again ambiguous due to the fact that α also measures the share of capital
income and the gains from specialization.
32Of course, a higher average productivity implies a higher distance of the average to the cutoﬀ, so φ increases
with the breadth and dispersion of the underlying distribution, b0 and θ.
33This is because proﬁts are higher the larger α, see the paragraph below equation (17).
30v(b,·) → v(bL,·)).34
Next, aggregating over the intermediate ﬁrm’s outputs in (1) using the equilibrium quantities











































Equation (38) demonstrates quite clearly the close analogy to a representative ﬁrm model,
where Y = (ALY)1−αKα. In the present environment with heterogeneous ﬁrms, the (endoge-
nously increasing) degree of specialization is complemented by the (static) average input co-
eﬃcient that describes how eﬃcient capital goods can be manufactured to produce output. A
degenerate one point distribution at b = bL (θ → ∞) implies φ → 1.35
The output-capital ratio. We already know from the household’s optimal consumption
decision, that the savings behavior is not aﬀected by the productivity distribution of interme-








































































Result 2. The output-capital ratio depends positively on the interest rate. Unless entry costs
have an impact on the interest rate, the output-capital ratio is independent of barriers to entry.
The evolution of A for a given cutoﬀ. Given bL, a compact law of motion for A is








Inserting LE from (11) yields
˙ A =
(LA − ˙ AAχ−1FL)A1−χG(bL)
FB
.









Compared to Jones (1995), the innovation technology is augmented in two aspects.
Firstly, without entry costs, all research attempts are successful. Here, the R&E productivity
(1/F a(bL)) decreases endogenously with bL because some innovations must be discarded.
F a(bL) = FL + FB/G(bL) captures the eﬀect of entry costs and the implied minimum
productivity requirement on the R&D productivity in terms of output quantities. Given A,
discovering and launching production for a new intermediate good is obviously less labor
intensive if the minimum productivity requirement is low, or easy to meet (because θ is high
so that G(bL) is high), and if few workers are necessary to conduct market entry (i.e. if FL
is low). Note that without entry cost (more precisely, with FL violating (PA1)), there is no
need to dispense with low productivity types. Here, in contrast, it takes 1/G(bL) times more
resources on average to discover a usable blueprint. Secondly, entry is modeled in such a way
that it takes workers away from R&D. This further increases the labor requirement necessary
32for usable blueprints.
Free entry in R&D for a given cutoﬀ. Diving the free entry into innovation condition













































we can replace the remaining integral term, the average proﬁts, with the expression implied




The right-hand side equals the average development costs of an actually producible durable
good: a newly discovered blueprint requires FL times Aχ−1 workers to conduct its market entry
and it takes FB/G(bL) times Aχ−1 workers on average to discover a producible blueprint in the
ﬁrst place (researchers on average must “draw” 1/G(bL) times to ﬁnd a suﬃciently productive
type). In endogenenous growth models with free entry into innovation and costless entry into
the product market, the R&D costs of every undertaken research project must equal its costs
in an equilibrium with positive growth. In the present environment, however, researchers face
uncertainty about the productivity and thus the market value of their innovations. In particular,
blueprints with a productivity below the cut-oﬀ will not earn their R&D costs. Hence, in
33equilibrium, sucessful innovations must earn excess rents. Inserting the deﬁnition of F a from




φv (bL,·) − wA
χ−1FL

< φv (bL,·) − wA
χ−1FL.
Given that the cutoﬀ is binding, i.e. G(bL) < 1, the average net value of entry (the right-hand
side of the inequality) exceeds the actual R&D costs of a single innovation to ensures that
research investments break even across all undertaken projects. More generally, if there is a
positive probability that research projects fail, the ex post return on sucessful projects must
exceed one, to ensure free entry ex ante. Since this feature is the main diﬀerence between the
heterogeneous ﬁrms and entry costs models and the canonical growth models, we explicitly
state it in
Result 3 (Excess rents for innovators). The average net value of entry exceeds the innovation
cost.
Return on investment in R&D. To avoid confusion, we explicitly state that ex ante zero
proﬁts free entry in R&D imply that the ratio of the average ﬁrm value to the average R&D




Whenever the R&D costs should increase as a consequence of increasing entry costs, the average
returns to successful R&D would increase by the same factor.
Recap. Let us recapitulate brieﬂy. Melitz (2003) showed that dealing with ﬁrm heterogene-
ity is easy when consumers have love of variety preferences ` a la Dixit-Stiglitz because these
preferences still allow us to work with a single, representative ﬁrm. The same is true if we
follow Ethier (1982) and use a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the production of output. To reveal
the basic mechanics of the model, we choose to express the aggregate ﬁrm outcome in terms of
the cutoﬀ productivity type ﬁrms. Given the cutoﬀ, R&E is conducted with a standard Jones
(1995) R&D technology. In fact, the closed economy model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and entry
costs boils down to the Jones (1995) model. The two additional ingredients, costly entry and





34where a is an exogenously given productivity parameter. Including entry costs, we can interpret
the productivity as being endogenous. In our formulation, it incorporates the labor requirement
necessary for market entry and to ﬁnd a suﬃciently productive blueprint (a in Jones’ model
can take any value so we set a ≡ F a(bL)).36
The aggregate equilibrium outcome with ﬁrm heterogeneity can conveniently be expressed
as the outcome with a representative ﬁrm.Market entry costs introduce a minimum productiv-
ity requirement that increases the average productivity of ﬁrms. The net eﬀect of entry costs
on the level of TFP, however, is ambiguous, since an increase in productivity in production
comes at the cost of an increase in the average labor requirement necessary to invent a new
variety. If the share of labor in R&D remains ﬁxed, this increase translates into a lower rate
at which new intermediate goods are introduced to the output sector. Note, however, that we
cannot assert that the R&D costs actually increase until we know more about the eﬀects of
the entry costs on the wage rate and the level of A which governs the spillover eﬀects.
Returning to the derivation of an equilibrium, it remains for us to solve for the lowest
productivity level that allows ﬁrms to earn the entry costs (the cutoﬀ productivity).
2.6 The equilibrium cutoﬀ productivity
Our choice of expressing the aggregate intermediate ﬁrm outcome in terms of the cutoﬀ pro-
ductivity type ﬁrms shows clearly that solving for the cutoﬀ productivity requires only the free
entry into R&D condition and the condition for proﬁtable market entry. To see this, recall that
the free entry condition requires that the average productivity type ﬁrms’ values net of entry
costs are equal their R&D costs. The value of ﬁrms with the average productivity in turn is
closely linked to the cutoﬀ productivity ﬁrms’ values, see (36) for a given A. By deﬁnition, the
cutoﬀ productivity type ﬁrms’ net/market value in turn is zero, i.e. their operating value equals
the entry costs. The equilibrium cutoﬀ productivity must therefore imply an average ﬁrm value
that exactly meets the average R&D costs of ﬁnding a usable blueprint. Combining (23) and













The wage rate and the scaling factor Aχ−1 drop out because of identical technologies in R&D and
market entry. Hence, free entry into R&D requires the average net value of a proﬁtably usable
blueprint FL(φ − 1)wAχ−1 = (φFL − FL)wAχ−1 = φvLwAχ−1 − FLwAχ−1 times the fraction
of usable blueprints G(b∗
L), to equal the discovery costs FBwAχ−1. Put diﬀerently, researchers
may expect a usable blueprint after 1/G(b∗
L) = FL(φ − 1)/FB draws on average. If successful,
the return on the research investment equals FL(φ−1)/FB, so that, in expectation, researchers
exactly break even on average. Since blueprints with productivities below the cutoﬀ have zero
value, the share of usable discoveries is equal to the inverse of the return on investment in R&D
for any usable blueprint.
From the deﬁnition of G(b) in (4), b∗
L = [G(bL)∗]
1










b0 (> 0). (45)
The separation of ﬁrms into proﬁtable producers and ﬁrms that exit comes solely from the
entry costs. As mentioned earlier, b∗
L → ∞ as FL → 0 (i.e. the cutoﬀ is not binding as b0 is
ﬁnite, b∗
L = b0). The minimum productivity requirement, 1/b∗
L, is obviously higher, the higher
FL.37 Interestingly, the eﬃciency with which researchers operate to ﬁnd new blueprints (1/FB)
has a negative impact on the highest admissible input coeﬃcient: the cutoﬀ input coeﬃcient
is smaller, the more eﬃcient the development of new blueprints occurs (i.e. the smaller FB).
37The closed economy model in this chapter merely serves as a starting point for the analysis of marginal
changes in the openness of foreign markets (as indicated by the foreign market entry costs). While the above
comparative static is helpful to understand the model’s mechanics, we do not want to take the productivity-
increasing eﬀect of local market entry costs too serious. This is because sunk entry costs (like, e.g., costly
regulation) in general deter the creation of new ﬁrms, a feature broadly supported by the data, see Alesina et
al. (2005), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), and Klapper et al. (forthcoming). Loosely speaking, the average ﬁrm
in Greece, where entry costs are about US$ 6900, is hardly believed to be more productive than the average
ﬁrm in Canada, where entry cost are much lower (US$ 280 according to Buettner, 2006).
36Figure 5: b∗
L as a function of θ (upper left panel), FL (upper right panel), and α (lower panel).
In other words, an R&D sector with a low productivity allows intermediate ﬁrms to be less
eﬃcient in production (horizontal and vertical productivity are complements). This is intuitive
because a less productive R&D sector implies less pronounced horizontal competition from new
entrants (and higher proﬁts for incumbent ﬁrms). Figure 5 depicts the cutoﬀ input coeﬃcient as
a function of θ (upper left panel), FL (upper right panel), and α (lower panel). We summarize
these ﬁndings in
Result 4 (Minimum productivity requirement). Entry barriers introduce a minimum produc-
tivity requirement for intermediate goods ﬁrms. This requirement is higher when the capital
share in the production of output is large (when α is large) and when researchers are productive
in the discovery of blueprints (when FB is small).38
Note that since the factor prices drop out in the determination of the cutoﬀ, see (43), the
38Given the diﬀerent meanings of α, the result with respect to the capital share is again ambiguous.
37production structure is not essential for the determination of the cutoﬀ when the production
functions in R&D and entry are identical.
2.7 Properties of the autarky equilibrium
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium labor allocation and the evolution of
horizontal specialization.
Irrelevance of entry costs for the allocation of labor in R&E. Starting with the
labor allocation, we ﬁnd that the relative inputs of labor in R&D and entry are not aﬀected
by barriers to entry as measured by FL. This at ﬁrst glance astonishing feature is concealed in
existing models, where there is no explicit distinction between entry workers and researchers.
BRN and GS take a short cut by assuming that the discovery of new intermediates takes a
certain amount of knowledge and that it takes an additional amount of knowledge to enter a
market subsequently. As a consequence, they directly employ an R&E-knowledge production
function like (40). Clearly, we we do not alter the modeling substantially given that we maintain
the mechanical link between entry workers and researchers implied by identical production
functions. Exploring the relation between entry workers and researchers, however, reveals how
restrictive this assumption actually is: in equilibrium, the allocation of labor between market
entry and R&D is not aﬀected by the entry barriers.






from (44) into (25):
LB
LE
= φ − 1. (46)













Hence, the existence of a binding cutoﬀ is suﬃcient to ﬁx the relative labor shares in R&D and
entry, irrespective of the level of the barriers to entry. At second glance of course, the increase
38in the labor requirement per usable blueprint is only one side of the coin. Turning the minimum
productivity requirement up side down, barriers to entry reduce the share of newly invented,
usable blueprints. In equilibrium, a change in the barriers to entry induces a change in the share
of usable blueprints that exactly oﬀsets the change in the labor requirement for developing a
usable blueprint. Formally, from (44), G(b∗
L)FL is ﬁxed independent of FL.
More explicitly, lowering FL has two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, a reduction in the
barriers to entry frees labor from the conduct of entry for a given number of innovations (i.e.
LA/LE rotates counter-clockwise around LY/L = 1 in Figure 4). On the other hand, the number
of newly invented intermediate goods increases for a given number of researchers because the
reduction in entry costs relaxes the minimum productivity requirement (and thereby reduces
the average labor requirement necessary to discover a usable blueprint). Hence, there are more
usable innovations for which the free entry workers conduct market entry. If there is a change
in the share of researchers as a fraction of the labor force, it is accompanied by an equally sized
change in the share of entry workers.
Result 5 (Labor allocation between R&D and entry). In equilibrium, the relative use of labor
in R&E, LE/LB, is independent of the level of the entry costs.
Law of motion for A. Using F a(b∗






Barriers to entry decrease the rate at which new blueprints are introduced to the production
of output, and their impact is stronger the easier it is for the producers of output to replace
inputs of less eﬃcient ﬁrms by (cheaper) inputs of more eﬃcient ﬁrms (as φ is increasing in ).
The underlying R&D productivity (1/FB) drops out because the productivity of blueprints
used in active ﬁrms is conditional on exceeding the cutoﬀ. On average, the discovery of these
blueprints requires FB/G(b∗
L) (times Aχ−1) workers. Since the probability of drawing a produc-
tivity of at least 1/b∗
L in equilibrium always takes the same eﬀort (G(b∗
L) = FB/[FL(φ − 1)] is
linear in FB), conditioning on b ≤ b∗
L removes FB from the law of motion for A.
Result 6 (Irrelevance of FB for ˙ A). In equilibrium, the law of motion for A is pinned down by
the entry costs irrespective of the productivity in R&D.
39Equation (40) indicates that the reduced form of our model yields the Jones (1995) model.
We will verify this conjecture explicitly in the following section. For now, note that we are
free to choose the units of measurement in the production of output, so that the production
function of output in (1) can equivalently be stated as






αdj, δ > 0, ˙ δ = 0. (50)









































so that we get a standard Cobb-Douglas production function for output:
˜ Y = (ALY)
1−αK
α. (51)
By deﬁnition, more productive ﬁrms produce more output out of a given amount of input.
Hence, δ increases as FL decreases since the average productivity depends positively on the
monotonically increasing minimum productivity requirement introduced by entry costs.
2.8 Balanced Growth Path
Given that the cutoﬀ is determined by instantaneous optimality conditions, the dynamics of
the model are identical to the dynamics of the Jones (1995) model (which are analyzed in
Arnold, 2006). For the sake of completeness, we adapt the analysis in Arnold (2006) to the
present environment where intermediate ﬁrms have heterogeneous input coeﬃcients, but can
be summarized by a representative ﬁrm. We then use the laws of motions of key variables to solve
for the equilibrium allocation along a balanced growth path. Following Arnold (2006), deﬁne
the stationary variables ˜ l ≡ L/Aχ, z ≡ Y/K, γ ≡ cL/K , and ν ≡ (1−α)Y/[
R A
0 v(j)dj] = (1−
40α)Y/[Aφv(b∗
L). We use ˜ l instead of l ≡ L/[φFLAχ] = ˜ l/(φFL) to trace the R&E productivity in
the law of motion for A. Of course, we can alternatively derive the balanced growth path without
these deﬁnitions.39 Deriving the entire dynamic system, however, increases our understanding
of the model’s mechanics and gives us an idea of the interdependencies oﬀ the balanced growth
path.
Deﬁnition 2 (Steady state). A steady state is an equilibrium with l, z, γ and ν constant.
Before we consider the dynamic system, we ﬁrst report the steady state growth rates of all
endogenous variables.
2.8.1 Steady state growth rates
By deﬁnition of a steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. Imposing a constant
growth rate on consumption requires, via the Euler equation (12), that the interest rate is a
constant as well. Accordingly, from (15), the prices of the intermediate goods are constant.
From labor market clearing, labor in all sectors must grow at the population growth rate so as
to ensure that the labor shares are constant. Proﬁt maximization in the production of output
then implies that the input quantities of intermediate goods also grow at rate n, see (14). As
prices and the interest rate are constant, the same holds true for proﬁts and ﬁrm values, see
(18) and (22). Then, using the results of the aggregation in (32) and (51), the capital stock
and ﬁnal output grow at rate n + n/χ. For the growth rate of blueprints to be a constant, B
must grow at rate n/χ.40 As b∗
L is a constant (see (45)), (24) demands that A is a constant
fraction of B. Hence, A grows at the same rate as B. Finally, the proﬁt maximizing labor
demand in the production of output in (13) implies that the wage rate grows at rate n. To
summarize, ˆ A = ˆ B = ˆ w = ˆ c = n/χ, ˆ K = ˆ Y = n + n/χ, ˆ LY = ˆ LE = ˆ LB = ˆ x = ˆ π = ˆ v = n, and
ˆ r = ˆ p = ˆ b∗
L = 0.





since AφπL = (1 − α)αY . From (6) in a steady state, r∗ − ˆ v = π(j)/v(j) = π (bL,·)/v (bL,·). Substituting for
the dividend ratio delivers ν∗.
40In (40), ˙ A = A
1−χLA
φFL , so that ˙ ˆ A = 0 requires ˆ A = n
χ. Hence, (24) and (44) yield ˆ B = ˆ A = n
χ.
41In a steady state, the growth rate of consumption per capita, ˆ c/c = n/χ, and the Euler





+ n + ρ. (52)
That is, the long-run interest rate is such that it removes the dissaving motives from popula-
tion growth, subjective discounting, and growth (which is larger the smaller the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution).41
Result 7 (Optimal consumption determines steady state interest rate). In a steady state, the
interest rate, i.e. the factor price for intermediate goods ﬁrms, is independent of barriers to
entry.
Impact channels of entry costs. While this relation is generally well known for the Jones
(1995) model, it is an important observation with respect to the impact of trade. Intuitively
speaking, a reduction in the barriers to trade exerts an production-expanding eﬀect (via
additional entry and production for foreign markets by exporters) which is expected to bid up
the factor price. In fact, in the Melitz (2003) model, the trade-induced increase in the real wage
rate is the only channel though which trade openness drives the least productive ﬁrms out of
the domestic market (by increasing the local market’s minimum productivity requirement). In
particular, the constant price elasticity of demand implied by the Dixit-Stiglitz index severely
limits the possible impact of trade on factor price eﬀects. Changing the number of competitors
or their productivity leaves the elasticity of demand unaﬀected (see Melitz, 2003, p. 1715).
In the present model, Result 7 implies that the steady state factor price is independent
of the minimum productivity requirement implied by the entry costs. In looking for the
impact of trade in a monopolistic competition model under CES production, this observation
hints at looking for decreases in the prices for the other production factors, labor and knowledge.
In what follows, we deduce the laws of motions and the steady state values for the trans-
formed variables. If one is less interested in this rather technical derivation, one can skip this
41From the point of view of the market for the investment good, the determinants of r equivalently reﬂect
the scarcity of raw capital.
42paragraph. The stationary values of key variables are identical to those in the Jones (1995)
model since the minimum productivity requirement only enters through the productivity in
R&E.
2.8.2 Laws of motions for key variables
To economize on notation, let η(b∗
L) = ηL, π(b∗
L,·) = πL and v(b∗
L,·) = vL. Log-diﬀerentiating
the deﬁnition of γ, we have









To substitute for ˙ c/c and ˙ K/K, note from the output-capital ratio in (39) that
α
2z = r.
Dividing by K, the resource constraint in (10) implies ˙ K/K = z − γ. Using these expressions
together with the Euler equation yields the law of motion for γ:

















The aggregate ﬁrm value is equal to
R A
0 v(j)dj = φAvL (see (36)). As vL(r − ˆ v) = πL from (22)
and (20), the denominator of ν = (1 − α)Y/(φAvL) is
φAvL =
φAπL
r − ˆ v
. (54)



















can be expressed as a constant fraction of aggregate output. Recognizing −α = 1− and using
(16),




αdj = α(1 − α)Y. (55)
Taken together, (54) and (55) imply r − ˆ v = αν. Replacing r = α2z gives the law of motion for
the intermediate ﬁrms’ values:
ˆ v = α(αz − ν). (56)
43The equilibrium law of motion for A from (49) can be rewritten using the labor market clearing
condition (7), the equilibrium demand from the aggregate output sector (14), and the free entry


















or simply ˙ A/A = l − ν.






























We can replace the wage rate in the above expression from the free entry condition (which in


























or, replacing ˙ A/A from (57) and ˙ v/v from (56),











Turning to ˜ l, ˙ ˜ l = ˜ l(g − χ ˙ A/A), and inserting ˙ A/A from (49), one obtains









Finally, a diﬀerential equation for ν is obtained as follows. Dividing (10) by K, we get the
law of motion for the capital stock,
˙ K
K
= (z − γ). (62)











˜ l + (α − χ)ν − α
2z

+ z − γ. (63)
Now plugging this expression together with the laws of motion for v(j) and A in (56) and (57)










˜ l + (α − χ)ν − α
2z

+ z − γ −
˜ l
φFL
+ ν − α(αz − ν).
After collecting terms, the law of motion for ν equals





































































∗ − (1 − α)z
∗. (68)
These four equations are readily solved for a unique steady state. Eliminating χ/(φFL)˜ l∗ from















∗ − (1 − α)z
∗. (70)






















45Let ∆ = (σ −1)n/χ+ρ. Combining (69) and (71) to derive ν∗ and z∗, and using (67) and (68)


























































The steady state in (72)-(74) and (76) is the steady state in the Jones (1995) model with a ≡
φFL (where ”a” in Jones (1995) is the inverse of the R&D productivity). The present modeling
of ﬁrm heterogeneity and R&D implies that entry costs and ﬁrm heterogeneity exclusively aﬀect
the productivity of R&E, and hence ˜ l = L/Aχ, in the long-run.
Arnold (2006)’s ﬁndings on the dynamics of the Jones (1995) model are thus robust to our
extensions. In particular, ∆ > 0 is suﬃcient to ensure that all stationary variables are positive,
utility is bounded ((1 − σ)˙ c/c − ρ < 0 since ˙ c/c = n/χ), and that the transversality condition
holds, so that a steady state exists if and only if ∆ > 0.
Using the steady state values we ﬁnd that this “independence” result carries over to the
allocation of labor.
Result 8 (BGP labor shares). In steady state, the allocation of labor between R&E and pro-
duction is independent of FL.
This observation is easily veriﬁed by combining the condition for optimal labor in production































46As α > 0, and ∆ + n/χ > 0, we have 0 < LY/L < 1. From this observation and the labor
market clearing condition (7), we directly infer that 0 < LA/L < 1 and LA/L = 1− ν∗
l∗ is given
irrespective of the level of FL.43
Similarly, using (3), (11), (24), and G(b∗





















Since the labor shares are independent of the barriers to entry, the total labor income is
also independent of the entry costs. Due to the Cobb-Douglas production of output we have
wLY = (1 − α)Y , see 13, and hence
wL
Y
= (1 − α)
L
LY
= (1 − α)
ν∗
l∗ .
No reallocation between factor incomes. Do entry costs aﬀect the aggregate distribu-
tion of wage and capital income in the steady state? Using the deﬁnition of z in wLY = (1−α)Y






is independent of barriers to entry.
Having characterized the equilibrium in the closed economy, we now turn to the open econ-
omy.
3 Trade
We include characteristic features of international trade in the simplest possible way. Consider a
world of two economies, each one as described in the previous section. The two economies have
identical preferences, technologies, production structures, and identical capital and labor en-
dowments. Only intermediate goods are traded internationally.44 The free ﬂow of intermediates




44Including trade in the ﬁnal good would allow imports of new physical capital.
47TBTs. Empirically, TBTs remain important obstacles between developed countries despite
various rounds of free trade negotiations. Importantly, TBTs are pure trading costs, and as
such should be interpreted distinctly from the local market entry costs. TBTs are ﬁxed costs
associated with the entry of ﬁrms into the export market and account for country speciﬁc
product/production standards/regulations, additional certiﬁcation procedures, or additional
bureaucratic burdens that make it harder for foreign ﬁrms to supply the domestic market than
for their local competitors.45 To capture the relative disadvantage for foreign ﬁrms, we follow
Melitz (2003) and assume that foreign ﬁrms face higher entry costs when entering the export
market than local ﬁrms that enter that same market. Due to symmetry, exporting thus comes
at higher ﬁxed costs than producing for the local market from a domestic ﬁrm’s point of view.
Hence, there is another cutoﬀ productivity, 1/bE, for exporting. In the presence of TBTs, bE is
lower than bL, so that the equilibrium productivity pattern in the local and the export market
matches the empirical regularity that the bulk of ﬁrms sells only locally and only the most
productive ﬁrms export. As an aside, the empirical trade literature has also clariﬁed that there
are no feedback eﬀects from exporting to a ﬁrm’s productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and
Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). Hence, the fact that input coeﬃcients remain constant is
in line with recent empirical evidence. Returning to the model, we account for the diﬀerent
sources of TBTs and iceberg costs by using diﬀerent “factor intensities” for the two types of
trade barriers. With respect to the ﬁxed export costs, we adapt the modeling in the literature
and assume that ﬁxed export costs are wage costs.
Iceberg costs. The variable trading costs are modeled as Samelson-type iceberg costs and
as such decrease the productivity in the production of exported units. Since intermediate goods
are manufactured using physical capital, variable trading costs constitute capital costs to the
ﬁrms.
In what follows, we describe the additional assumptions for the open economy and then
deduce the adjusted optimality conditions.
45Roberts and Tybout (1997) validate empirically that the sunk cost associated with exporting are of a
substantial magnitude for exporting ﬁrms.
483.1 Open economy
3.1.1 Technologies
Output. We distinguish local and export market variables of intermediate ﬁrms by a subscript
i, i ∈ {L,E}. To avoid additional complexity, we focus on the case where there is no overlap
between local and foreign varieties at the point in time when trade liberalization occurs (cf.
Tang and W¨ alde, 2001). That is, if foreign ﬁrms decide to export, local producers of output are
able to employ a higher number of intermediate inputs, thereby exploiting increased gains from
specialization. We denote the worldwide “number” of diﬀerent existing intermediate goods by
˜ A > AL. Without loss of generality, let the intermediate goods index be such that j ∈ [0,AL]
indicates locally produced intermediate goods, while j ∈ (AL, ˜ A] refers to imported varieties.








where xi (j) = xL (j) for j ≤ AL represents the input quantity of a locally produced good and
xi (j) = xE (j) for j > AL is the input quantity of an imported intermediate good.
Intermediates. When exported, τ ≥ 1 units of an intermediate good must be shipped for
every unit that arrives (exporters get paid for the arriving units). From an exporting ﬁrm’s
perspective, producing one (actually sold) unit for the foreign market thus ties up τ times more





where here and in what follows τi = τ if goods are exported (i = E), and τi = 1 if
goods are sold locally (i = L). Iceberg costs therefore imply that the productivity of a
ﬁrm depends on the destination of the manufactured output. The productivity in the
production of exports thereby decreases linearly in the iceberg costs. To simplify the exposi-
tion, we treat the marginal trade costs as a technology such that they do not yield any income.46
46See Matsuyama (2007) for a theory of factor biased trading costs.
493.1.2 Markets
Barriers to trade. Launching an export business with a newly discovered intermediate good
requires the entrant to hire A
χ−1
L FE “entry workers”, where FE ≥ FL so that T ≡ FE/FL ≥ 1.
T (a mnemonic for TBTs) measures how much harder it is for a foreign ﬁrm to enter the
local market compared to a domestic ﬁrm. If T > 1, additional proﬁt opportunities from
exporting accrue only to the most productive ﬁrms which can proﬁtably aﬀord to sink the
foreign market entry costs. Below, incremental trade liberalization is modelled as a decrease
in either transportation costs, τ, or TBTs, T. In the case of TBTs, we formally consider the
comparative statics with respect to FE (evaluated at FE ≥ FL).
Proﬁtable market entry. Firms base the decision to export on the same forward-looking
investment calculus as the decision to enter the domestic market in autarky. Given its produc-
tivity, each ﬁrm knows its future proﬁts in either market and decides to enter a market only
if the present value of its proﬁts in that market exceeds the entry costs to that market. We
denote by 1/bL and 1/bE the lowest productivity levels that allow ﬁrms to operate proﬁtably
in the local and the export market, respectively. The presence of TBTs (i.e. FE > FL) implies
that bE < bL (we will see below that proﬁts increase monotonically in productivity), so that
only the most productive ﬁrms export. Hence, xE (j) in (80) is zero for some j > AL.47 While
entering the domestic market is less involved for local ﬁrms, it still takes costly resources and
hence there is a minimum productivity requirement for active ﬁrms (the lower bound on FL in
(PA1) ensures that bL < b0 in equilibrium so that the minimum productivity requirement is
binding for some ﬁrms). The least productive ﬁrms, which do not meet the minimum produc-
tivity requirement, exit immediately. Firms with input coeﬃcients bL ≥ b > bE sell exclusively
in their home market and the most productive ﬁrms with b ≤ bE sell both in the local market
and export.
Market entry and research again use the same production technology and we deﬁne its
productivity to include the eﬀects of international knowledge spillovers.48 For further reference
47By the deﬁnition of AL as the number of actually active ﬁrms, all xL (j) are positive for j ≤ AL.







be the present value of operating proﬁts πi (j) of ﬁrm j in market i.
Since ﬁrms diﬀer only in terms of their productivities, proﬁt maximization together with
(82) implies that vi(j;b(j)) = vi(j0;b(j0)) if and only if b(j) = b(j0). With a slight abuse of
notation, we can therefore drop the ﬁrm index and equivalently state the present value of proﬁts






where πi (b,·) is the operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm with input coeﬃcient b in market i. Diﬀerentiating
(83) with respect to time t, the deﬁnition of vi (b,·) implies
rvi(b,·) = πi(b,·) + ˙ vi(b,·). (84)
Entry into R&D. Including the additional proﬁt opportunities net of entry costs for






















if ˙ BL > 0. In equilibrium, the innovation costs have to equal the expected market value of a
newly discovered blueprint, i.e. the sum of the expected operating values net of entry costs in
both the local and the foreign markets. Expectations are taken with respect to productivity,






where AF is the knowledge stock in the foreign country, σ ≥ 0 measures the intenisty of the across-the-border
spillovers, and ˜ FB is an exogenous productivity parameter. With symmetric countries it holds that AF = AL






as in the closed economy.
51blueprints with a high productivity allow for additional proﬁts in the export market. We show
below that market values are monotonely decreasing in b so that the cutoﬀs bL and bE, i.e. the
productivities that yield zero in the squared brackets in (85), are unique.49 In particular, the



























No imitation or “footloose” production. Two simplifying assumptions ensure that
ﬁrms have no means to avoid the trading costs. First, ﬁrms are not able to form multinational
companies or issue production licenses, i.e. there is no “footloose” production. Second, trans-
portation costs are lower than the cost of patent infringement, so that imitation and limit
pricing by foreign ﬁrms is not proﬁtable.
3.2 Equilibrium
We proceed by deriving the equilibrium for given cutoﬀ levels, then aggregate, and use the
results to determine the cutoﬀ productivity levels.
3.2.1 Optimality conditions
Households and ﬁrms. Optimal consumption is not aﬀected by the degree of trade open-
ness. The demand for intermediates from the ﬁnal good sector in (14) now applies to all
j ∈ [0, ˜ A] and the proﬁt-maximizing monopoly price in (15) refers to the price of selling lo-
cally, pL(j) = rb(j)/α. When exporting, the monopolists charge the proﬁt maximizing price
49Under our parameter assumptions, both cutoﬀs also exist within the support of the equilibrium distribution
of active ﬁrms’ productivities.









and earns proﬁts πi(j) = (1 − α)Ri(j) in that market.From the fact that pi(j) = pi(j0) and
xi(j) = xi(j0) if and only if b(j) = b(j0), equilibrium prices and quantities can equivalently be




, xi(b,·) = α
2 [rτib]
− LY.
The same is true for revenue and proﬁts,
Ri(j) = α
2−1 [rτib(j)]
1− LY, dm πi (b,·)
and was already used for the present value of proﬁts as deﬁned above, see (83).
A simple connection between the cutoﬀs. Due to the symmetry assumption, the re-
lation of the two cutoﬀ productivities is easily derived as follows. Combining the local and
the foreign market entry condition, (86) and (87), gives vE(bE,·)/vL(bL,·) = T. For a given b,
vE(b,·) and vL(b,·) diﬀer only because of the marginal trade costs. Since ˆ vi(b,·) = ˆ v(·) from
(84), πE(b,·) = πL(τb,·) implies vE(b,·) = vL(τb,·). We know from the closed economy that the
ratio of any two ﬁrms’ market values only depends on their input coeﬃcients (and , see (22)).
In this symmetric setup, the two cutoﬀ input coeﬃcients are therefore exclusively related by
variable and ﬁxed barriers to trade:
bE
bL
= ψ, 0 > ψ ≡ τ
−1T
− 1
−1 ≥ 1. (91)
ψ is an inverse measure of the real barriers to trade and measures the economies’ openness.
Under free trade, τ = T = 1 and ψ = 1. The more restricted trade is (i.e. the larger τ and T),
the smaller is ψ. Autarky corresponds to ψ → 0.
Marginal trade costs drive a wedge between the minimum productivity requirement for the
local and the export market, and TBTs have a more severe impact the larger . A high elasticity
53of substitution in the production of output depresses prices, proﬁts, and hence market values
so that ﬁrms must be more productive to cover the entry costs.50
3.2.2 Aggregation
Output. Making use of the convention that goods j ∈ [0,AL] refer to locally produced inter-


















Switching from ﬁrms/goods j to productivities b, the term in squared brackets becomes
AL
R bL










L was used (see (91)). We again solve the model in terms of the local cutoﬀ productivity
and hence aggregate to get expressions in terms of bL. Due to symmetry, AL = A
♦
L, bL = b
♦
L










































































1 ≤ Ψ ≡ 1 + ψ
θT ≤ 2, ∂Ψ/∂τ < 0, ∂Ψ/∂T < 0.
50Note again that α also measures the capital intensity in the ﬁnal good production and the gains from
specialization.
54Relative to the closed economy (compare (37)), the only diﬀerence is the additional parameter
Ψ. Prohibitive trade costs imply Ψ = 1 (autarky), and free trade (T = τ = 1) corresponds to
Ψ = 2.








where b(j) and x(j) refer to the total output of an intermediate ﬁrm (i.e. output sold in the
local market and, if applicable, output sold in the export market) and the destination dependent








































The last term is again 1 + τ1−τ−1−θT
− θ
−1+1 = Ψ, such that
K = φΨALbLx(bL,·). (93)









Relative to the closed economy, the only diﬀerence is again the parameter Ψ.
Aggregate revenues, proﬁts, and market values. From (80) and (90), the total pay-










Trade balance gives that the revenues of foreign producers (the second term) equal the revenues














where R(j) denotes the total revenues accruing to ﬁrm j, i.e. RL(b,·) for bL ≥ b > bE, and













































51We could take the following shortcut here: replacing the term in squared brackets with the expression from
the derivation of aggregate output, the revenues of local producers amount to
Z AL
0






Y ALα2−1r1−LY = αY.
Since aggregate proﬁts are a fraction 1 − α of aggregate revenues, aggregate proﬁts are
Z AL
0
π(j)dj = α(1 − α)Y.
In an equilibrium with balanced growth, using (84), we have
Z AL
0
v(j)dj = α(1 − α)Y/(r − ˆ v).
This directly yields the open economy ν.




Accounting for costly international trade simply adds the factor Ψ ≤ 2. The average ﬁrm value
is
R AL
0 v(j)dj/AL = ΨφvL(bL,·). In the absence of trade, Ψ = 1, and we are back in the closed
economy where φ relates the value of ﬁrms with the cutoﬀ productivity to the average value
of ﬁrms in the local market. If trade is costless, the average ﬁrm value is
R AL
0 v(j)dj/AL =
2φvL(bL,·). The aggregated average ﬁrm value of producers that are only selling to the local





Entry into R&D for given cutoﬀs. Equation (91) is the key in solving the open economy















































L w[FB + G(bL)FL + G(bE)FE]





















57The term in squared brackets on the right-hand side is, like F a(bL) in the closed economy, the
quantity of labor necessary to invent and market a new intermediate good in the absence of
knowledge spillovers (χ = 1). Using (91), it can be expressed as a function of the local cutoﬀ


































To avoid cumbersome expressions, we keep in mind that T is contained in ψ also, but collect

























≡ F (bL). (98)
The left-hand side of (97) can be expressed in similar terms. Using ˆ vi(b,·) = ˆ v(·), dµ =
θbθ−1/bθ
Ldb, and (91), the average value of a usable blueprint becomes
(1 − α)α2−1r1−LYθ













Integrating and rearranging terms yields
(1 − α)α2−1r1−LYθ






θ −  + 1
+ τ
1−(ψbL)θ−+1








r − ˆ v
.
From (89), this equals φvL+ψ
θ−(−1)φvE. Costly trade lowers the value of exporting relative to
local sales (ψ ∈ (0,1] and θ >  − 1). Like in the closed economy, φ relates the average market
value of exclusively locally selling ﬁrms to the market value of ﬁrms with the local market cutoﬀ
productivity. Since we aim at aggregating in terms of the local market cutoﬀ, we rewrite the



























We now solve the model for its steady-state equilibrium. In the following section, we provide
additional economic intuition and discuss the reallocation and incentive eﬀects induced by
international trade.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
In view of the close and block-recursive relation of bL and bE in (91), the deﬁnition of an
equilibrium in the closed economy carries over to the open economy (including bE, the additional
equation is (91)). The steady state growth rates are the same as in the closed economy, and
ˆ bE = 0 follows from (91). The cutoﬀs are again instantaneously ﬁxed.
Equilibrium cutoﬀs. Combining the entry conditions for the local product market and
for R&D in (87) and (100) again pins down the local productivity cutoﬀ b∗
L, and via (91) b∗
E






































































+ ΨFL = ΨφFL. (104)
3.2.4 Dynamic Equilibrium
Laws of motions and steady state. Turning to the dynamic equilibrium, the same trans-
formed variables as in the closed economy apply. The integral in the denominator of ν now
goes from 0 to AL, and ν = (1 − α)Y/
R AL
0 vi(b,·)dµ(b∗
L) = (1 − α)Y/[ΨφALvL(b∗
L)]. Just
like in the closed economy, rK/α=αY , or r = α2z. Also, using the adjusted deﬁnition of ν,
˙ K/K = z − γ and ˙ v/v = α(αz − ν) continue to hold. The innovation costs change from
F a(b∗
L)wAχ−1 = φFLwAχ−1 to F(b∗
L)wAχ−1 = ΨφFLwA
χ−1
L , and this only aﬀects the law of
motion of AL in terms of ˜ l: ˙ AL/AL = ˜ l/(ΨφFL) − ν. Accordingly, the laws of motion for γ and
z are still given by (53) and (60), where ν in (60) refers to the adjusted deﬁnition from above.
The law of motion for ˜ l becomes









Including the ˙ AL/AL, the law of motion for ν reads














ν + (1 − α)z − γ
#
.
Accordingly, the steady state in the open economy is the steady state in the closed economy in












52For free entry into R&D to be in line with the local market entry condition, it must be that the impact of
trade on the average ﬁrm value (relative to the local cutoﬀ productivity type ﬁrm value) is equal to the impact
of trade on the average development costs (relative to the entry costs), i.e. Ψ must drop out in the free entry
into R&D condition, compare (100) using (104).
604 Trade liberalization
To ease the exposition, suppose without loss of generality in the following analysis that b0 = 1

























With free trade, τ = T = 1, and all ﬁrms are exporting (bE = bL). In this case, output in
both economies is produced using ˜ A = 2AL intermediate goods at any point in time.
We now consider policy induced changes in the barriers to trade and show the presence of
a Melitz (2003)-type reallocation towards the more productive ﬁrms.
4.1 Cutoﬀs and industry reallocation



























The derivative with respect to T has the same sign.53 It is negative, implying that a decrease in
both types of trade costs increases b∗
E and hence lowers the minimum productivity requirement
necessary for proﬁtable exporting.54 Simple inspection of (105) shows that a reduction in the









A decrease in either τ or T raises the minimum productivity requirement for all ﬁrms. Taken
together, trade liberalization allows more ﬁrms to export proﬁtably (and implies an increase in
the intensive margin), but at the same requires all newcomers to be more productive.
53More precisely, to analyze the eﬀect of a decrease in TBTs, we take the derivative with respect to FE and





























61Result 9 (Reallocation). Trade liberalization lowers the productivity requirement for exporting,
but increases the minimum productivity requirement for newcomers.
The implied reallocation of resources from less productive ﬁrms towards more productive
ﬁrms is the same as in Melitz (without productivity growth) and BRN (with fully endogenous
steady state growth and scale eﬀects). Including capital in production, factor prices are irrele-
vant for the determination of the cutoﬀs as long as R&D and entry are conducted with identical
production functions. Therefore, GS ﬁnd exactly the same cutoﬀs.
4.2 Labor shares
A direct implication of identical steady state values in autarky and in the open economy is that
the allocation of labor between production and R&E is not aﬀected by the exposure to trade.
Moreover, for the reasons explained in detail in the closed economy (compare Section 2.7), the
allocation of labor between R&D and entry is not aﬀected by a reduction in trade costs.
Result 10 (No impact on labor shares). The allocation of labor in R&D, market entry, and
production is not aﬀected by the exposure to trade.
4.3 Incentive eﬀects of trade liberalization
We have seen three channels by which trade openness aﬀects the incentives to innovate. Firstly,
trade liberalization increases the minimum productivity requirement for all ﬁrms and thereby
raises the average discovery costs of newly invented varieties. Secondly, at the same time, the
expected value of a usable blueprint increases because a reduction of TBTs lowers the entry
costs for the export market. Thirdly, this innovation enhancing eﬀect from an increase in the
returns to successful R&D is reinforced by the fact that more blueprints can be used to launch
a proﬁtable export business.
Growth eﬀects under fully endogenous growth. BRN study the growth eﬀects of
trade liberalization in a fully endogenous growth framework (with scale eﬀects). They ﬁnd that
openness to trade is growth enhancing if and only if the expected sunk cost of R&E decrease
(their Result 1, p. 10).
62The sunk costs of R&E consist of the quantity of workers necessary to conduct R&E for
marketable blueprints, magniﬁed by the impact of spillovers, and the associated wage. BRN
state that the actual labor requirement unambiguously increases if a country incrementally
opens up to trade. The impact on the price for R&E depends on the exact speciﬁcation of the
engine of growth, but is likely to be positive. In the Grossman-Helpman speciﬁcation (Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Ch.3), the net-eﬀect permanently depresses growth.
Incentive eﬀects under semi-endogenous growth. In our formulation, the impact on
the labor requirement is the similar. The innovation enhancing reduction in the labor require-
ment for entry is oﬀset by the increase in the labor requirement due to a lower local cutoﬀ:55
F(b
∗




increases as T and/or τ decrease (which increases Ψ). If trade where free, F(b∗
L) = 2φFL.
GS study how trade aﬀects the level of total productivity (which in their model coincides
with per capita consumption), i.e. variety growth and the productivity in production. To do
so, they compare per capita consumption along the steady-state path of two economies which
exclusively diﬀer in terms of the trade costs. Since the ratio is constant over time, they conclude
that trade increases productivity if and only if the path associated with lower barriers to trade
has higher per capita consumption. This conclusion depends on the strength of knowledge
spillovers in R&D. If spillovers are suﬃciently strong, trade liberalization retards productivity
growth in the short run (and makes consumers worse oﬀ in the long-run).
5 Conclusion
Recap. We lay out a speciﬁc environment to investigate how trade aﬀects endogenous R&D in
a dynamic model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and costly trade. Focusing on trade in non-durable
intermediate goods, we highlight important features of the production structure when ﬁrms
use physical capital and showed that trade in intermediate goods and a careful introduction
of capital in production does not alter previous ﬁndings on the reallocation of resources and
the selection of ﬁrms. We further ﬁnd that, albeit convenient, the assumption of identical
55The second equality follows by replacing FL with its normalized value in terms of FB.
63production technologies in R&D and entry is particularly restrictive. In particular, the labor
shares between innovation and market entry are ﬁxed independently of the level of barriers to
entry.
Avenues for future research. The present paper provides a framework for various ro-
bustness checks. In particular, including trade in the ﬁnal good and trade in durables is a
straightforward extension. More importantly, however, the environment described in this paper
allows us to include physical capital and/or units of output as an input in the entry process. A
second extension concerns the average R&D costs approach. Recall that inventing a blueprint
is costly, but the productivity implied by the discovered blueprint was a random draw. Hence,
there is no intentional investment in productivity, and high productivity types come “for free”.
Exploring the trade-oﬀ between high productivities and the number of usable blueprints at the
level of an individual researcher and thereby allowing for purposive investment in productivity
is a promising task. Finally, stripping down the model to its essential ingredients is an impor-
tant step in building a model that is both in line with empirical evidence and also amenable
to a thorough welfare analysis. Such a model is necessary to assess the suitability of trade and
welfare measures in empirical work. We leave this important challenge for future work.
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686 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of ν∗, z∗, l∗, and γ∗
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